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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3042 
_____________ 
 
ERIC BEYER, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DUNCANNON BOROUGH;  
DUANE HAMMAKER;  
PATRICK BRUNNER; AND 
GERALD BELL 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 09-CV-1398) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 8, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 14, 2011) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
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 Eric Beyer (“Beyer”) appeals the District Court‟s December 15, 2009, February 5, 
2010, and June 25, 2010 Orders and Memoranda dismissing his Amended Complaint and 
Second Amended Complaint against Duncannon Borough, Duane Hammaker 
(“Hammaker”), and Patrick Brunner (“Brunner”) (collectively, “Appellees”).1  Beyer 
contends that the District Court erred in holding that he did not plead facts sufficient to 
overcome a motion to dismiss his First Amendment retaliation claim.  We agree with 
Beyer that the District Court erred in dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claim.  
To the extent that Beyer appeals the District Court‟s dismissal of his First Amendment 
petitioning claim, we believe that the District Court did not err in dismissing this claim.  
For the following reasons, we will reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
facts.    
 Beyer worked as a police officer for the Duncannon Borough.  On November 9, 
2005, two officers were involved in a shootout with a man who was using a 7mm 
Remington Magnum rifle.  The two officers were armed with standard 12 gauge 
shotguns.  One of the officers was struck during the encounter and died.  This tragedy 
initiated a public discussion about whether the officers had sufficient weaponry to combat 
                                                 
1
 Although the District Court issued multiple Orders and Memoranda, for purposes of our 
review, it is only the District Court‟s June 25, 2010 Order and Memorandum that we 
currently consider since Beyer‟s Second Amended Complaint is before this Court.    
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criminals.  Beyer alleges that a 12 gauge shotgun cannot match the performance of a 
7mm Remington Magnum rifle.  As a result of the shooting, Beyer recommended the 
purchase of AR-15s, weapons which allegedly shoot at a high velocity.  Mayor Kraig 
Nace (“Nace”) subsequently authorized the purchase of two AR-15 rifles to be carried in 
the patrol cars for the Duncannon Borough.  In February 2006, the Duncannon Borough 
Council (“Council”) approved Nace‟s decision to purchase the two AR-15s.  Beyer 
alleges that after the acquisition of the AR-15s, the Council criticized the purchase and 
contended that the rifles were purchased without authorization.   
 In January 2008, Beyer used the pseudonym “big bear”2 and posted comments on 
the internet in opposition to the views of the Council members, who had been criticizing 
the purchase of the AR-15s.  In particular, Beyer opposed the views of Council members 
Gerald Bell (“Bell”);3 Hammaker, President of the Council; and Brunner, Chairman of 
the Council.  A debate ensued over the AR-15s and that discussion generated interest by 
the press.  In the winter of 2008, Beyer appeared on Fox 43 “News at Ten” to “report[] 
accurately many facts about the weapons.”  (App. at 60.)  On March 6, 2008, an “ad hoc 
committee,” chaired by Michael Fedor (“Fedor”), investigated the AR-15s.  The 
committee ultimately recommended to keep one of the AR-15s and sell the other.  The 
Council agreed with the committee‟s recommendation.  Beyer alleges that during Fedor‟s 
                                                 
2
 Beyer alleges that he posted on the internet under the pseudonym “big bear” and the 
Council inquired about postings by “Big Bear.”  We refer to “big bear” and “Big Bear” 
interchangeably as Beyer did in the Second Amended Complaint.   
3
 Defendant Gerald Bell was dismissed from the case by Order granting Motion to 
Dismiss on December 15, 2009.   
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investigation, Fedor “openly attacked” Beyer about the information Beyer had presented 
to the public.     
 On June 3, 2008, Beyer posted “information critical of [the Council] on the 
internet.”  (Id. at 61.)  Beyer did not use his own name or identify any Council members 
by name.  On June 17, 2008, Bell sent Beyer a letter indicating the Council‟s awareness 
of the internet postings by “Big Bear,” informing Beyer that some of the postings were 
inappropriate, and asking Beyer if he was “Big Bear.”  Beyer alleges that he was given 
twenty-four hours to respond to the letter.  He chose not to answer the Council‟s question 
as to whether he was “Big Bear,” without the advice of counsel.  On June 24, 2008, upon 
the advice of counsel, Beyer responded that he had used the pseudonym “Big Bear” to 
post information on the internet, but did not know if the “Big Bear” or “big bear” 
postings that the Council was referring to were his.  Beyer did admit to criticizing 
Council.   
 On July 1, 2008, Bell wrote Beyer and requested that Beyer appear on July 8, 2008 
at 8:00 a.m. before the committee for a “fact-finding interview.”  (Id. at 62.)  According 
to Beyer, he discussed scheduling the interview with Mayor Nace and Derr and informed 
Bell that he would agree to meet at a time that did not interfere with his full-time 
employment.  On July 16, 2008, Bell allegedly wrote Beyer a letter stating that “during a 
regular session of the Duncannon Borough Council[,] Council voted to terminate your 
(Eric Beyer‟s) employment with the Duncannon Borough Police Department effective 
immediately.”  (Id. at 63.)  Hammaker signed the letter as President of Council.   
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 On July 17, 2009, Beyer filed a complaint in federal court.  On August 27, 2010 
and September 11, 2009, Appellees filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint.  On 
September 25, 2009, Beyer filed an Amended Complaint.  On December 15, 2009, the 
District Court granted in part, and denied in part, Appellees‟ Motions to Dismiss the 
Amended Complaint.  On December 29, 2009, Beyer filed a Motion for Reconsideration.  
On February 5, 2010, the District Court denied Beyer‟s Motion for Reconsideration.   
 On February 19, 2010, Beyer filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting a First 
Amendment retaliation claim, a First Amendment right to petition claim, and a wrongful 
discharge claim under Pennsylvania law.  On June 25, 2010, the District Court granted 
Appellees‟ Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  The District Court held 
that despite the existence of protected speech and retaliation, Beyer did not plead facts to 
support an inference that the protected speech was a substantial factor in the retaliation.  
The District Court also dismissed Beyer‟s First Amendment petitioning claim on the 
ground that Beyer filed no petition prior to the alleged retaliation.
4
  Finally, the District 
Court did not retain supplemental jurisdiction over Beyer‟s wrongful discharge claim 
under Pennsylvania law.
5
           
                                                 
4
 Beyer does not raise any arguments regarding the District Court‟s dismissal of his First 
Amendment petitioning claim in his opening brief on appeal and has accordingly waived 
it.  Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 296 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Absent 
compelling circumstances . . . failing to raise an argument in one‟s opening brief waives 
it.”).  Nonetheless, we agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that Beyer did not 
petition the government prior to the Appellees‟ retaliation.   
5
 Appellant does not seek review of the District Court‟s determination that pendant state 
claims should not be addressed.  
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      II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Beyer‟s claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review the District Court‟s 
final order.    
 We review a district court‟s order granting a motion to dismiss de novo.  Victaulic 
Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007).  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
should be granted only if the plaintiff is unable to articulate “enough facts to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --U.S.--, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  A plaintiff is 
required, by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), to provide the “grounds of his 
entitle[ment] to relief [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).       
III. ANALYSIS 
 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff must 
allege that the plaintiff‟s “activity is protected by the First Amendment, and that the 
protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.”  Gorum v. 
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (explaining that after these 
two elements are established, the burden shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the 
same action would occur if the speech had not occurred).   
A.  Protected Activity 
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 To determine whether a public employee‟s speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, we must make two inquiries:   
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as 
a citizen on a matter of public concern.  If the answer is no, 
the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based 
on his or her employer‟s reaction to the speech.  If the answer 
is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.  
The question becomes whether the relevant government entity 
had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public. 
 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citation omitted).   
 Our inquiry begins with determining whether we can “read the complaint to allege 
that [Beyer] was speaking as a „citizen.‟”  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 
242 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[O]n a 12(b)(6) motion, the court examines „whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added)).  We believe that Beyer has alleged facts that he was 
speaking as a citizen, rather than as, on the other hand, a public official.
6
  Public 
employees do not speak “as citizens” when they make statements “pursuant to their 
official duties.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that the 
public employee had written a memo “pursuant to [his] official duties,” and thus as a 
public employee, because “that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to 
do.”  Id. at 421.  The Supreme Court contrasted Garcetti to Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
                                                 
6
 The District Court held that Beyer did not establish a causal connection and stated that it 
did not need to reach the issue of whether Beyer was acting as a citizen or public 
employee.   
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U.S. 563 (1968), where the speaker‟s “letter to the newspaper had no official significance 
and bore similarities to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.”  Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 422.   
 We conclude that Beyer sufficiently alleged facts that he was speaking as a citizen, 
rather than as a public employee.  See id. at 421.  Beyer was a police officer who 
recommended the purchase of the AR-15s after “hours of research, on his own time, to 
determine what would be the best weapon system and caliber for use in Duncannon 
Borough, considering the price of the weapons, ease of use and training, cost of 
ammunition, and maintenance.”  (App. at 57.)  Beyer alleges that his research and 
discussion about the weapons were “on his time,” rather than pursuant to his duties as a 
police officer.  Also, Beyer‟s comments, at issue, were posted pseudonymously on an 
internet site and not pursuant to his duties as a police officer.     
 Next, we must determine whether Beyer pled sufficient facts that his discussion 
about the AR-15s was a matter of public concern.  An employee‟s speech is a matter of 
public concern if “it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, 
or other concern to the community.”  Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 195 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Determining whether speech 
is a matter of public concern “requires us to examine the content, form, and context of 
that speech.”  Snyder v. Phelps, --U.S.--, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-17 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) (explaining that an individual‟s credit report did 
not address public concern, while matters regarding the political and moral conduct of the 
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United States and its citizens were of public concern even where the messages “fall short 
of refined social or political commentary”).  Speech about police misconduct, for 
example, is a matter of public concern.  Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 
2007); Markos v. City of Atlanta, Texas, 364 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2004).   
 Focusing on the content, form, and context of Beyer‟s speech, we hold that Beyer 
sufficiently pled that his speech was a matter of public concern.  He alleges that the 
content of his speech was to “report[] accurately many facts about the weapons,” (App. at 
60), which is related to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.  
See Holder, 987 F.2d at 195.  Discussion about the AR-15s relates to issues about the 
safety of the Duncannon Borough‟s Police Force, which implicates public safety and 
extends beyond issues specific to Beyer.  Beyer pleads sufficient facts that the AR-15s 
were of public concern.  In particular, Beyer alleges that the discussion regarding AR-15s 
was an issue of “officer and citizen safety,” that the information about the weapons was 
“highly technical” and unavailable to the average citizen, and a “press discussion of the 
issue began to grow.”  (App. at 57, 59); see Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. 
Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that discussion regarding the 
government‟s waste of taxpayers‟ money is a matter of public concern) (citation 
omitted)); Cf. Gorum, 561 F.3d at 187 (holding that an individual student‟s future as a 
professional athlete did not pertain to a public concern).   
 Beyer‟s personal interest in the discussion of AR-15s because of his 
recommendation to purchase the weapons does not lead to the conclusion that the speech 
10 
 
is of purely personal interest.  See Markos, 364 F.3d at 571 (“While speech on behalf of a 
coworker would be private in many situations, it is infused with an element of public 
interest here because it assured the public of the trustworthiness of some of its police 
officers.”).   
 Communicating the message in a public manner through the internet and news 
further weighs in favor of the conclusion that the speech here is of public concern.  See 
id. (noting that public communication, rather than internal communication, weighs in 
favor that the speech is a public concern); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 
(1997) (conduct protected by the First Amendment extends to communications made 
through the medium of the internet).  
 We hold that Beyer alleges facts that his speech was protected sufficient to 
overcome a motion to dismiss.   
B.  Protected Activity Was A Substantial Factor In The Retaliation 
 To establish that the protected conduct was a substantial factor in the retaliation, a 
plaintiff usually must prove either  
(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a 
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a 
causal link.  In the absence of that proof, the plaintiff must 
show that from the “evidence gleaned from the record as a 
whole” the trier of fact should infer causation.   
 
Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also 
Marra v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “[i]n 
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certain narrow circumstances, an „unusually suggestive‟ proximity in time between the 
protected activity and the adverse action may be sufficient, on its own, to establish the 
requisite causal connection” (citation omitted)).  The decision-makers must be aware of 
the protected conduct for it to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision.  Gorum, 
561 F.3d at 188.    
 Beyer alleges that he posted on the internet in January 2008, appeared on Fox in 
the winter of 2008, and posted on the internet again on June 3, 2008.  Bell wrote Beyer a 
letter on June 17, 2008 questioning him about the internet posts and again on July 1, 2008 
demanding a meeting with Beyer.  On July 16, 2008, Bell wrote Beyer a letter informing 
him of the decision to terminate his employment.  In light of the temporal proximity 
among these events, we cannot agree with the District Court that Beyer failed to allege 
facts regarding the causal connection and the retaliation.  See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 
267; Marra, 497 F.3d at 302.
7
  The temporal proximity clearly makes it plausible that the 
protected activity was a substantial factor.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the District Court‟s June 25, 2010 
Order.  Based on this Court‟s ruling, we will remand the First Amendment retaliation 
                                                 
7
 Throughout Appellant‟s brief, Appellant‟s Attorney, Don Bailey, asserts that the trial 
courts and the appellate court in this Circuit have not permitted lawsuits that he has been 
involved in to proceed unencumbered.  This is not an issue that this Court needs to 
address at present.  There is no basis to believe or conclude regarding the instant 
litigation that Appellant or Appellant‟s attorney is not being given the opportunity to be 
heard. 
12 
 
claim to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
